This article presents a cultural analysis of HBO's drama series, The Wire. It is argued here that, as a cultural text, The Wire forms a site of both containment and resistance, of hegemony and change with recourse to the regulation of illicit drug markets. In this sense The Wire constitutes an important cultural paradigm of drug policy debates, one that has significant heuristic implications regarding both the present consequences and future directions of illicit drug policy. Ultimately, it is demonstrated below that through its representations of the tensions and antagonisms characteristic of drug control systems, The Wire reveals larger predicaments of governance faced by neoliberal democracies today.
Introduction
Real is pretend, and pretend is real.
From the autobiography of Felicia 'Snoop' Pearson (Pearson and Ritz, 2007) . 1 Recent years have seen the significant growth of criminological interest in various forms of media and their symbolic and textual meanings. Photographic images (Carrabine, 2012 ), children's cartoons (Kort-Butler, 2012) , video games (Groombridge, 2008) , and films Tzanelli et al., 2005; Rafter, 2007) have all been fruitfully investigated with recourse to the role(s) they play in the construction and development of public understandings of crime and justice. Since television programmes are one of the most powerful vehicles driving and informing such popular understandings, their inclusion within criminological analysis is not only justified, but critically important to the continued development of criminology as a field of study. In this article, following Rafter's (2007) call for the extended exploration of such 'popular criminologies', I investigate HBO's drama series The Wire in this light.
Given that The Wire only concluded in 2008, the level of interest it has generated from within various academic disciplines is impressive; its sociological significance is now well established (Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011) . 
Criminology, Media and Moving Images
The relationship between crime and media is one of criminology's most researched subjects (see Carrabine, 2008 and Jewkes, 2011 for excellent overviews). However, it is only relatively recently that the discipline has witnessed what Michael Schudson (1987) once called the 'new validation' of popular culture in academic study. If the irresolvable debates about media-crime causality can be sidelined for the purposes of this article, it is possible to locate the roots of this validation process in the moral panic theories of the 1970s (e.g. Cohen, 1972; Young, 1971) . Here sociologists of crime and deviance started to pay attention to the ways in which media 'constructed' crime and criminals. Important as these studies were, however, it is almost certainly the case that the 'media' remained conceptually and theoretically ambiguous in them.
Also, such works were more concerned with crime's misrepresentation and the formation of dominant knowledges than they were with symbolic and/or textual meaning.
However, the ensuing proliferation of entertainment media from the 1980s onwards was accompanied by growing academic recognition of their relevance. For Hall (1981) , an important step in this process involved accounting for 'popular culture'. He argued that it was no longer feasible to view culture as 'monolithic', as an all-encompassing structural entity that simply fed passive consumers ideological frameworks of meaning. Such a conceptual error was evident in the moral panic theories that juxtaposed reality and its representation between the actual lives and practices of the Mods and Rockers in Cohen's study, and their representation as something else in the media. For Hall, such a polarisation created and sustained a false reality-representation dichotomy. McRobbie and Thornton reached similar conclusions, claiming that: 'media is no longer something separable from society.
Social reality is experienced through language, communication and imagery. Social 4 meanings and social differences are inextricably tied up with representation ' (1995: 570) . In short, theorists of crime and media increasingly came to recognise the boundaries between the two as being irrecoverably blurred. Representations came to be recognised as sites of knowledge in of themselves, as the spaces within which contestations of meaning are continually played out.
Before progressing any further, it is important to assert the critical and generative capacity of this blurring. As Sparks (1992) is not a monolithic site of symbolic interpolation into conventional mores about crime. It is also a space in which law and crime are re-imagined in many different ways and in which it is not inevitable that audiences will identify with the law or view film narrative through the law. It is not simply that representations play a role in the maintenance and proliferation of a priori knowledge about crime, law and order, but rather, that representations are the sites -as they exist in and of themselves -through which knowledge and meaning are simultaneously created, maintained, and/or contested.
Taking the above as her starting point, Rafter (2007) argues the current assortment of media representations of crime are best understood through the umbrella concept of 'popular criminology'. She defines this as 'a category composed of discourses about crime found not only in film but also on the Internet, on television and in newspapers, novels and rap music and myth' (Rafter, 2007: 415 ). Rafter's popular criminological project is the investigation of the relationship between representations and academic criminology (see also Rafter and Brown, 2011) . Such a view recognises alternative 'ways of knowing, crafting an 'egalitarian epistemology' with the potential to transcend the disciplinary confines of traditional criminology. From this position, a potentially limitless array of topics can be (and have been) researched regarding the ways in which they are culturally represented. However such variety 5 has also meant that the methods by which such analyses are conducted vary considerably.
In doing research on popular culture there is a subtle yet important epistemic distinction that needs to be made between 'ideological' and 'postmodern' sensibilities (Yar, 2010) . Some scholars prioritise the creation and maintenance of hegemonic ideologies (e.g. Adorno, 1991) , while others adopt postmodern positions that are sceptical of efforts to affix or inscribe meaning(s) to any given text (e.g. Young, 1996) . Such distinctions are evident in the qualitative/quantitative divide within the literature on how drug users and dealers are culturally represented (e.g. Boyd, 2002; Manning, 2007; McKenna, 2011; Shapiro, 2002; Stephens, 2011; Taylor, 2008) .
Some of these studies adopt a quantitative, 'content analysis' approach that delineates the ideological and discursive construction of drug users as bad/deviant/sick etc (e.g. Taylor, 2008) . And then others take a postmodern qualitative approach presenting representations as theory themselves, as cultural texts in their own right depicting the conceptual fluidity of notions of, for example, heroin addiction (e.g. Stephens, 2011) . Whilst the divergence between these positions may be somewhat slim, such distinctions have important implications for the present analysis.
McKenna
In reading The Wire as a cultural text, the partisan employment of either of these epistemic and/or methodological positions becomes problematic. To treat The Wire solely as an ideological conduit renders its viewers little more than passive receptors, as well as relieving the show of its capacity to generate meaning. Yet, to consider it devoid of any inherent meaning would miss its compelling challenges to (and support for) competing ideologies of drug control. As such, the task here was to incorporate both positions; to adopt a 'synthetic and critical' (Yar, 2010: 77) framework through which to investigate the show as a cultural product. The Wire, in short, plays a role in ideological construction/maintenance, while also existing as a space through which hegemony is challenged and meaning contested. It is a cultural paradigm of the drug policy problematic, a cultural space from within which the key questions of drug policy debates are re-appropriated and re-imagined. As a result, it can be read as a potentially unrivalled representation of drug policy dilemmas, of the 'genuinely hard questions ' (MacCoun and Reuter, 2011) surrounding what is to be done about drug control. However before engaging with these matters, The Wire itself requires some attention. Sun, the latter a police detective turned schoolteacher in the same city. As such, The
Wire is best considered a work of creative non-fiction, as being equally predicated on their collected experiences and imaginations. Žižek (2011) usefully draws attention to this nuanced intersection of imagination and experience, to the complexities of The Wire's 'realism' (also, see Jameson, 2010) . It is not so much realist in an objective sense, simply presenting objectively realistic material, but subjectively realist in that it offers its viewer realistic accounts of the unreal. That is, of scenarios which have not (or could not?) happen, but which do happen -for example, a serial killer being fabricated by a reporter and homicide detective; a police chief legalising drugs; or two detectives piecing together the sequence of events at a 'cold case' murder scene using nothing but some photographs, a tape measure, and the word 'fuck' (or variants of) thirty-eight times in a row. In this sense The Wire is able to distance itself from crude realism yet still foster a status as more than fiction.
There are numerous ways in which this status is skilfully maintained. The show's cast is littered with real Baltimore police officers, reporters, drug dealers and politicians. The viewer sees a former mayor of Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke, make two 7 appearances, while one of the city's former drug king-pins, Melvin Williams, features regularly too. On-location filming frequently features highly symbolic panned views of Baltimore's divided cityscape. The viewer is regularly presented with life 'in the pit' -a rundown housing estate -as overshadowed by the affluence of the downtown buildings; the opulent roof of Baltimore city hall can be clearly seen from some of the most impoverished areas of the city. Likewise, shots of the Western district's drug corners frequently intersect episode scenes, reinforcing this strong sense of locale.
As with many of the show's actors, these are real locations, the actual sites of drug dealing, murders, and urban degradation. 4 It is through the above that the show conveys an authenticity that transcends mere 'fiction'.
Such authenticity was of paramount importance to the show's creators. For angry piece of television -'The Wire was not merely trying to tell a good story or two. We were very much trying to pick a fight' (Simon, 2010: 3) . The provocative intent on the part of the writers regarding the myths of meritocracy is perhaps most evident in the show's continued references to 'the game'. From the drug corners to the offices of city hall and the Baltimore police department, 'the game' is the quest for success, as synonymous with distinction as it is with survival.
Ultimately The Wire leaves its viewers with little room for manoeuvre here. The show (and its resulting critical reception) gave its creator a platform to shout from and he used it to pursue a distinct political agenda. Failure to recognise this political motivation would severely hinder an analysis of the show such as this one: but crucially, it is also the case that any meaningful engagement with The Wire as a cultural text must ascend over and above authorial intention. As Barthes concluded, reliance upon an author 'is to impose a limit on that text … to close the writing' The Wire's potential to generate meaning is highlighted through the above example, and this is precisely why the synthetic and critical epistemology alluded to in the previous section is so crucial: meaning must not be inscribed upon The Wire (through its creators' intention or its viewers' interpretations), yet it must not be considered devoid of it either. In terms of achieving this balance, the show's 'more than fiction' status is key; it must be recognised as an already existing cultural component of on-going debates about the issues it (re)presents. The Wire is certainly a conduit of pre-existing ideologies, but one where meaning is far from guaranteedit is also a space through which the future shape of debates can be reconfigured.
Knowledge and meaning are created, contested and/or confirmed by a whole host of parties in their reading of The Wire. It is the above combined that render this programme 'more than' mere 'representation'. Penfold-Mounce at al. forcefully argue it 'is able to provide a social science-fiction; an "inexistent" tale that produces a "real being" in a form that inspires the sociological imagination' (2011: 156 original emphasis). The Wire needs to be understood as more than 'just' a realistic TV programme; it is transcendental television. It is a visual embodiment of the antagonisms between reality and representation with the capacity to simultaneously challenge and/or enhance understandings of the multitude of topics it depicts.
The Wire, Drugs and Drug Policy
There are many themes that could be gleaned from The Wire for analysis here, but two are most pertinent: its representations of street-based heroin and crack cocaine 9 dealing, and 'Hamsterdam', an experiment in harm reduction-based market regulation. The following brief synopses are included for the unfamiliar reader.
Drug Dealing in The Wire
The Wire shows a city where for many people the sale of drugs is a fact of everyday life. It shows the residual aftereffects of prohibitive drug policy; a violent black market for heroin and crack cocaine that is aggressively policed. Most strikingly, the drug trade is shown to be thoroughly bound-up with the workings of the city: in one form or another, drugs and drug-money transverse Baltimore's entire social strata.
Avon Barksdale's 'crew' are engaged in street-level distribution in sophisticated and effective ways; Omar Little makes his living 'rippin' and runnin'' (robbing drug dealers, see Jacobs (2000) 
On 'Hamsterdam'
In addition to the above however, in Season Three, The Wire presents an experiment in the reformation of drug policy at the ground level -'Hamsterdam' (a term coined by Baltimore's young drug dealers upon being told that drugs are legal in 'Amsterdam'). Yet in Hamsterdam (much like in Amsterdam!) drugs are not legal.
Rather, providing certain rules are adhered to, the sale of heroin and crack cocaine is temporarily ignored by Baltimore's police force. In specified locations a policy of contends, but it also forms a cultural reference point from within which an alternative future direction of drug policy becomes discernable too.
The Wire as a Cultural Paradigm of Drug Policy Debates
The show's representations of some drug policy problems, and their possible solutions -when considered in tandem with academic discourses on these subjectscan be used to substantiate The Wire's position as a cultural paradigm of drug policy debates. It is to such a task that the remainder of this article is devoted.
The Unintended Consequences of Prohibition in The Wire
With a few exceptions (e.g. McKeganey, 2011), drug policy analysts tend to believe that the current system of prohibition operated at a national and international level is ineffective at best, and dangerous and damaging at worst (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001; Seddon, 2010; Stevens, 2011) . Internationally, barring the numerous historical conflicts that brought the system to be (see Courtwright, 2001 ), drug control is reasonably straightforward in that prohibition is dictated by three UN conventions:
The 1961 Little neatly exemplifies this point -he is the 'honourable thief', the man who holdsup drug dealers with a shotgun, yet takes his aunt to church every Sunday morning.
He is also the only character never to swear. The viewer is led to respect, admire even, his most frequently stated moral imperative -that he would never raise his gun to a 'civilian' (someone not involved in the drug trade). Yet, such a code only serves to further legitimise the use of violence against those who are engaged in the drugs trade. In The Wire drug market violence is legitimised and maintained within such systems through the well developed cultural distinctions drawn between those who exist 'inside' and 'outside' of them. Here the show demonstrates its capacity to reconfigure this debate; violence is not just 'systemic' of drug markets due to their illicit nature (cf. Goldstein, 1985) , but a more nuanced phenomenon, primarily responsive to sophisticated cultural and ideological distinctions drawn within these market spaces, on both sides of the law. (2), it demonstrates the situation as not only self-replicating, but also in its current form, as precluding any real chance of significant change.
The Wire and the Future of Drug Policy
Despite the above it is crucial to recognise the fact that The Wire is not just a representation of the problems of prohibitive drug policy, it also has significant heuristic potential surrounding possible solutions. The Wire's representation of drug control is one of contestation; it concomitantly supports, challenges, and reconfigures the various positions in this debate. This contention is returned to below, but as a precursor to the ensuing analysis two points must be stressed, firstly the limitations of the arguments herein, and secondly the claim that a drug market is a market. To clarify, simply 'reverse engineering' solutions to complex social-structural problems through representations alone is ontologically unsound. Bluntly put, it is the epistemic basis through which the programme's capacity to shift drug policy debates can be realised.
Others have recognised The Wire's potential in this respect (Beilenson and McGuire, 2012: Ch. 4; Žižek, 2011) yet have failed to follow it through sufficiently.
It is not simply that 'free zones' (as sites where the sale of drugs could be permitted)
should actually be introduced, or that they would necessarily be effective or even desirable. But rather, that this is the direction in which drug policy debates should be heading -that the prohibition-legalisation stalemate can (and must) be transcended through the consideration of 'radical' alternatives such as this. Some of the most progressive developments in drug policy, theoretically and pragmatically, have come from similarly 'unconventional' approaches in recent years. For example, the Swiss programme of heroin prescription and supervised consumption facilities came about 15 through the introduction of quasi-free zones in Zurich. Ultimately, these 'drug parks' proved untenable and undesirable, but their role in the formation of current Swiss policy -in shifting the terms and parameters of the debate -was significant (Uchtenhagen 2009 ). Furthermore, research on amphetamine-type stimulants in the Netherlands is also pertinent. Through circulating pictures of poor-quality ecstasy pills throughout dance venues it was observed that the low-quality products disappeared from the market. As the distribution of better quality (and as such, safer)
produce became linked to the sellers' commercial interests, the market reacted in such a way that reduced its capacity to cause harm (see Spruit, 2001 ).
These are policy interventions that recognise markets as markets, and crucially, as being responsive to various strategies of regulation not just the application of the criminal law. There is a strong literature-base supporting such contentions in the growing and influential field of regulatory theory (see Black, 2002; Braithwaite, 2008; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . 'Regulation' is defined within this paradigm as any 'sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes' (Black, 2002: 26) . Importantly here, drug policy is nothing if not regulation. As such, regulatory theory's potential in the context of drug policy has been noted before (Ritter, 2010; Seddon, 2007 Seddon, , 2010 Seddon, , 2013 . One of the key benefits these works sought to highlight is the ability of a regulatory conceptualisation to 'broaden the field,' to recognise the need to think about more than the law when it comes to drug policy.
The Wire too renders this clear, in the absence of large-scale legal changes significant effects can be enacted quickly through the manipulation of existing market systems to produce less harmful results. Through Hamsterdam The Wire demonstrates the possibilities inherent in a system of governing through over and above one of governing against. This particular storyline strongly resonates with cutting-edge social research. Specifically, with the concept of 'nodal governance' (see Burris et al., 2005; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Shearing and Froestad, 2010) .
Nodal governance is a model strongly linked to regulatory theory that examines power's operation through governance in complex, networked, social systems. It is '[a]n elaboration of contemporary network theory that explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit' (Burris et al., 2005: 33 Shearing and Froestad, 2010; Wood and Shearing, 2007) shows how non-punitive community groups -dispute resolution groups, or 'peacemaking' groups -reduced conflict in their communities by empowering disenfranchised populations and reducing their respective governance deficits. The same principle is inherent in Hamsterdam; this is a programme in which a failed and harmful system of regulatory governance (the prohibition of drugs) is replaced by an alternative system intricately connected to the lives and worlds of the population it seeks to govern/regulate.
As an alternative technology of governance, Hamsterdam harnesses collective resources to address collective problems. For example, aid workers are able to set up stations within its boundaries and better coordinate their efforts to address the health issues associated with drug use, effectively strengthening this particular 'node' within the network. Similarly, in episode 3.2 when it becomes apparent that there are many unemployed children in the zones (they are no longer needed as lookouts since the market is no longer illicit), Detective Carver initiates a 'tax' on the drug crews, instructing them that everyone must still be paid, 'shit is like unemployment insurance' he claims. Later he uses a similar tax to purchase sports equipment to occupy the youngsters. In these examples, collective resources are combined to address collective problems, neatly representing Braithwaite's (2008) regulatory notion of 'active responsibility'. The onus is upon 'taking responsibility for putting things right in the future', rather than the 'passive responsibility' of 'holding someone responsible for what they have done in the past' (Braithwaite, 2008: 76-77 The implication here is this -the problems of drug markets cannot be solved with recourse to the ideologies of governance that support and maintain their very existence. Just as liberal democratic systems of governance are seemingly incapable of restraining the imperatives of capital (Badiou 2012; Žižek, 2008 , so too are neoliberal drug control strategies incapable of restraining drug markets which are underpinned by identical socio-political principles. Neoliberalism cannot be reformed from within its own discursive and conceptual boundaries, and neither can drug policy. Just as radically divergent systems of governance are required to address the destructive nature of capitalism (Badiou 2012; Žižek, 2011) , systems of drug control also need to be completely re-imagined and re-conceptualised to reduce the harm they cause. True, there are amendments to the regulatory systems employed 18 that can improve things on the ground right now, and they should of course be pursued, but ultimately they will not suffice alone. The Wire makes clear this point in its representation of the drug policy problematic -the entire system needs to be reevaluated both ideologically and pragmatically. If drug control is to ever effectively eliminate the harms associated with the use and sale of illicit substances, then its purpose, principles and methods -that is, its very existence -requires a thorough critical interrogation.
Conclusions
By way of a conclusion I hope this article has gone some way towards strengthening the position of cultural analyses such as this within criminology, particularly with recourse to television programmes. Whatever the subject of criminological debates, the capacity of televisual representations to challenge and reconfigure them should never be underestimated. In support of this claim this article has positioned The Wire at the core of on-going debates about illicit drug policy. This programme -as a cultural text -has been shown to constitute a cultural paradigm of the drug policy problematic, one that provides an important visual representation of the many tensions and antagonisms inherent in systems of drug control. Importantly in closing though, it must be noted that The Wire has contributions to make far beyond drugs and drug policy. Space precluded a more detailed exploration of the show's treatment of race, gender, sexualities, and childhood for example, yet all of these and more are features of The Wire that merit further investigation.
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The Wire has been shown above to contest the terms of drug policy debates, and in so doing, draw attention to some of the larger issues of governance facing the latemodern world. While Prez's claim about the football match from which this article gleaned its title, 'No one wins. One side just loses more slowly' (episode 4.4) is a pessimistic metaphor for the drug situation, it can also be understood as an invitation that is potentially resistant and generative at the same time. If nobody can win when the game is played like this, then we urgently need to change the rules, or better yet, play a different game. In this sense, The Wire resonates with so much more than drug policy debates. Like all great 'fiction' it provides a space through which its viewers/readers/listeners can begin to think differently about the worlds they inhabit.
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Bluntly put, regarding drug policy and the larger ordering of our social systems alike,
The Wire is emblematic of the crucial need for new thinking. show's resonance with numerous pre-existing academic concerns, as too are the three responses to Chaddha and Wilson (2011) in Critical Inquiry (see Jagoda, 2011; Warren, 2011; Williams, 2011) . 7. In one of The Wire's finest moments, Colvin's last words to his superiors as they fire him, 'get on with it motherfuckers', are the exact same words used by the gang boss Stringer Bell as he is gunned down by Omar Little and Brother Mouzone. Again, 'the game' is played on both sides of the law.
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8. However things are changing here -the development of a more 'collective EU voice' regarding stricter drug control has evolved alongside an increasing reliance upon neoliberal economic policies (see Bergeron and Griffiths, 2006) .
9. In this famous scene D'Angelo teaches the young dealers the rules of chess through an analogy of the drugs ring that is highly representative of US political systems; it is impossible for anyone other than the king to ever become the king, and in the game, 'pawns' are quickly felled. 
